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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from the grant of summary judgment we 
must decide whether defendants AT&T Corp., NCR Corp., 
Lucent Technologies, and Texas Pacific Group's agreement 
to restrict the hiring of certain employees upon Lucent's 
sale of Paradyne Corp. was a violation of S 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. We also must decide whether this 
no-hire agreement which effectively cancelled the plaintiff 
employees' AT&T pension bridging rights violated S 510 of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. W e hold the 
no-hire agreement was a valid covenant not to compete that 
was reasonable in scope and therefor e not a violation of S 1 
of the Sherman Act. But also we hold plaintif fs have 
presented sufficient prima facie evidence of AT&T and 
Lucent's specific intent to interfer e with an ERISA funded 
employee pension fund to survive summary judgment on 
the ERISA S 510 claim. 
 
I. 
 
In July 1995, AT&T, a long distance telephone and 
wireless services provider, decided to sell one of its 
affiliates, Paradyne Corp., a manufacturer of network 
access products for the telecommunications industry. 
Contemplating the sale, AT&T wanted to ensur e that 
Paradyne remained a viable entity because A T&T and its 
other affiliates, including Lucent Technologies, purchased 
many of the network access products Paradyne 
manufactured. To make Paradyne mor e attractive to buyers 
as an ongoing business, AT&T adopted a human r esource 
plan that placed restrictions on Paradyne employees' ability 
to transfer to other divisions of AT&T ("the Preliminary 
Net"). Specifically, the Preliminary Net precluded an 
employee who voluntarily left Paradyne from being hired by 
any other division of AT&T. The pr emise for the hiring bar 
was AT&T's belief that one of Paradyne's most marketable 
assets was its skilled employees. The retention of 
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Paradyne's employees, therefore, was considered essential 
for the sale of Paradyne. 
 
Shortly after adopting the Preliminary Net, A T&T 
consummated a business reorganization plan resulting in 
three independent companies: AT&T, Lucent Technologies, 
and NCR Corp. (the "trivestiture"). As part of the 
trivestiture, AT&T transferred ownership of Paradyne to 
Lucent. Consistent with the Preliminary Net, the Paradyne 
employees, now employed by Lucent, were pr ecluded from 
seeking re-employment at any other AT&T division or 
affiliate after the trivestiture. 
 
On July 31, 1996, Lucent sold Paradyne to Texas Pacific 
Group. Before closing, Lucent agreed, on behalf of itself and 
the other former AT&T affiliates, that it would not hire, 
rehire, retain, or solicit the services of any Paradyne 
employee or consultant whose annual income exceeded 
$50,000. This "Pre-Closing Net" was consistent with the 
understanding that Texas Pacific Group's interest in 
purchasing Paradyne was based on its desir e to acquire the 
technical skills of Paradyne's employees for a sufficient 
period of time to ensure a successful transition of 
ownership. 
 
Once the deal was closed, Lucent and Texas Pacific 
Group entered a post-closing agreement ("Post-Closing Net") 
in which Lucent warranted on behalf of itself and the other 
AT&T affiliates that for 245 days (8 months) following the 
sale and the expiration of the Pre-Closing Net, it would not 
seek to hire, solicit or rehire any Paradyne employee or 
consultant whose compensation exceeded $50,000. The 
eight month no-hire agreement had the practical effect of 
cancelling the Paradyne employees' accrued pension 
benefits under their former AT&T pension plans. Under the 
AT&T pension plan, employees were entitled to "bridging 
rights" which allowed them to retain their level of accrued 
pension benefits if they left AT&T and r eturned within six 
months. After six months, the bridging rights expir ed. 
Employees rehired after the six month period would need 
five years of employment to regain their pr evious pension 
levels. Because the Post-Closing Net barred Paradyne 
employees from returning to an A T&T affiliate for eight 
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months, these employees automatically lost the bridging 
rights they had acquired under their AT&T pensions. 
 
Before the sale was consummated, Texas Pacific Group 
hired an outside consultant to determine the benefit 
package it could offer the Paradyne employees. Paradyne's 
Vice-President of Human Resources, Sherril Claus Melio, 
who had previously held the same position when Paradyne 
was owned by AT&T and Lucent, assisted the consultant in 
drafting various benefit plan proposals. The consultant 
concluded that in order to make Paradyne financially 
competitive, Texas Pacific Group could not offer the same 
pension package AT&T had previously of fered its 
employees. Although Melio's exact role in T exas Pacific 
Group's decision is disputed, Texas Pacific Group 
ultimately decided not to offer a defined pension benefits 
program to its new employees. 
 
The plaintiffs are former Paradyne employees who allege 
the Preliminary Net, as well as the Pre and Post-Closing 
Nets, collectively represent an unlawful group boycott in 
violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act. Additionally, they 
contend the defendants conspired to eliminate their 
pension benefits thereby engaging in an illegal price fixing 
scheme in violation of S 1 of the Sher man Act. Furthermore, 
they allege the no-hire agreement, which effectively 
cancelled Paradyne employees' bridging rights under their 
AT&T pensions, violated S 510 of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act. 
 
In addressing these claims, the District Court held that 
plaintiffs failed to prove a violation ofS 1 of the Sherman 
Act and failed to produce sufficient prima facie evidence of 
AT&T and Lucent's specific intent to inter fere with an 
ERISA funded pension plan to support their S 510 claim. 
The court, therefore, granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. After the grant of summary judgment, 
plaintiffs filed a discovery motion in connection with an 
anticipated motion for class certification which the District 
Court denied. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.S 26 
and 29 U.S.C. S 1140 because plaintiffs' claims allege 
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violations of S 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and S 510 of 
ERISA. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on plaintiffs' antitrust and ERISA 
claims. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 
(1993). We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
legal determinations concerning class certification and 
review its factual findings for abuse of discretion. Bogus v. 
Am. Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
 
III. 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: 
 
       Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
       otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
       commerce among the several states, or with for eign 
       nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1 (1994). 
 
Under S 1, unreasonable restraints on trade are 
prohibited because they inhibit competition within the 
market. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. , 485 U.S. 
717, 723 (1988); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 
669 (3d Cir. 1993). In order to assert a cause of action 
under S 1, plaintiffs must prove they have suffered an 
antitrust injury that is causally related to the defendants' 
allegedly illegal anti-competitive activity. Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Once 
there is the finding of antitrust injury, courts examine the 
alleged illegal conduct under one of two distinct tests: per 
se violation or rule of reason. Under the per se test, 
"agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so 
plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the 
industry is needed to establish their illegality" are found to 
be antitrust violations. Nat'l Soc'y of Pr of. Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). For those activities not 
within the per se invalidity category, courts employ the rule 
of reason test. Under this test, plaintif fs have the burden of 
establishing that, under all the circumstances,"the 
challenged acts are unreasonably r estrictive of competitive 
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conditions" in the relevant market. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 28 (1911). "An analysis of the 
reasonableness of particular restraints includes the 
consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in which 
the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its 
effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for 
its adoption." United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 
596, 607 (1972). 
 
A. 
 
We hold the AT&T Preliminary Net was not a violation of 
S 1 of the Sherman Act. The District Court found that "as 
of . . . the date that the Preliminary Net was put into effect 
. . . , Lucent was a wholly-owned subsidiary of A T&T, and 
accordingly, the two companies were a singular entity that 
could not conspire to violate the Antitrust laws." Eichorn v. 
AT&T Corp., CA No. 96-3587, slip op. at *17 (D.N.J. 
September 10, 1999). In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), the Supr eme Court held 
the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary cannot themselves give rise to S 1 antitrust 
violations. The Court reasoned, "[a] par ent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary have a complete unity of inter est. Their 
objectives are common, not disparate; their general 
corporate actions are guided or determined not by two 
separate corporate consciousnesses, but one." Id. at 771. 
Because the Preliminary Net was an inter nal restriction 
between a single corporation, AT&T, and its wholly owned 
subsidiaries, Lucent and NCR, and not an agr eement 
between separate corporate identities, it was not a violation 
of S 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 769 ("An internal 
agreement to implement a single unitary fir m's policies does 
not raise the antitrust dangers that S 1 was designed to 
police."). Although plaintiffs assert A T&T and Lucent were 
not motivated by a single "corporate consciousness" 
because they were in the process of becoming separate 
entities, we believe that during the effective time period of 
the AT&T Preliminary Net, AT&T and Lucent retained a 
unified corporate interest for the purpose of antitrust 
analysis. It was not until AT&T divested all of its stock in 
Lucent and after the lapse of the Preliminary Net that the 
two companies became completely separate entities. 
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As Supreme Court and our precedent make clear, only 
anti-competitive actions between competitors give rise to 
Sherman Act liability. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771; Siegel 
Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Exp., Inc. , 54 F.3d 1125, 1132 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("The operations of a corporate enterprise 
organized into divisions must be judged as the conduct of 
a single actor."); Weiss v. Y ork Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985). As a single 
entity in a parent subsidiary relationship, the defendants in 
this case were incapable of conspiring to violate the 
antitrust laws through the Preliminary Net agreement. 
Siegel, 54 F.3d at 1132. 
 
We next turn to plaintiffs' claim that the Pre and Post- 
Closing Nets, collectively referred to as the no-hire 
agreement, represent an illegal gr oup boycott and a 
horizontal price fixing conspiracy under S 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Plaintiffs allege Lucent, AT&T and T exas Pacific Group 
horizontally competed for the plaintiff employees' technical 
skills and services. As competitors, they ar gue, the 
defendants conspired to suspend competition for plaintiffs' 
technical services with the purpose and the ef fect of locking 
them out of the labor market. See Anderson v. Shipowners 
Ass'n of the Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (agreement 
between most shipowners on Pacific coast to deny 
employment to any seaman who did not register with 
association was violation of S 1 of Sher man Act); Law v. 
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.) 
(NCAA rule limiting salary of basketball coaches was per se 
violation of S 1 of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 822 
(1998). By locking them out and effectively cancelling their 
entitlement to AT&T pension rights, plaintif fs argue the 
defendants conspired to fix the cost of labor in the market. 
In support, plaintiffs cite several Supr eme Court cases that 
hold horizontal group boycotts and price fixing conspiracies 
are per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See FTC 
v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. 411, 422 
(1990); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y , 457 U.S. 
332, 344-45 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979). 
 
But the facts here are substantially dif ferent from the 
classic per se horizontal price fixing and gr oup boycott 
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conspiracies the Court has generally found to be per se 
antitrust violations. Broad. Music, Inc. , 441 U.S. at 8 ("Easy 
labels [like price fixing] do not always supply ready 
answers."). Because of the fact specific inquiry required to 
assess antitrust liability under the Sherman Act, we will 
address each prong of the S 1 analysis. 
 
B. 
 
Private plaintiffs pursuing claims under S 1 of the 
Sherman Act have standing when they suf fer an antitrust 
injury that is causally related to the defendants' allegedly 
illegal anti-competitive activity. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
The Supreme Court has described antitrust injury as injury 
of 
 
       the type the antitrust laws were intended to pr event 
       and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts 
       unlawful. The injury should reflect the anti-competitive 
       effect either of the violation or of anti-competitive acts 
       made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be 
       the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would 
       be likely to cause. 
 
Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 
It is well established that an antitrust injury r eflects an 
activity's anti-competitive effect on the competitive market. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
344 (1990) ("The antitrust injury requir ement . . . ensures 
that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a 
competition-reducing aspect or ef fect of the defendant's 
behavior.") (emphasis in original). W e have consistently held 
an individual plaintiff personally aggrieved by an alleged 
anti-competitive agreement has not suffer ed an antitrust 
injury unless the activity has a wider impact on the 
competitive market. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. West 
Penn Power Comp., 147 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding action that did not lessen competition in a 
"marketplace" was not antitrust injury); Barton & Pittinos, 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (the determination of whether a party has 
suffered an antitrust injury "depends on how the market is 
defined"); Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. , 64 F.3d 869 (3d 
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Cir. 1995). While a plaintiff may have individually suffered 
an injury as a result of defendants' actions, the antitrust 
laws were designed to protect market-wide anticompetitive 
activities. Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 338 (quoting Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1902) ("The 
antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of 
competition, not competitors.") (emphasis in original)); see 
also Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n., 884 
F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding plaintiffs must "plead 
and prove a reduction of competition in the market in 
general and not mere injury to their own positions as 
competitors"). 
 
In dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claims the District 
Court stated, 
 
       Plaintiffs apparently argue that the injury to 
       competition is that they are prevented fr om providing 
       their services to AT&T, Lucent or its affiliates. Put 
       simply, the antitrust laws are not concer ned with 
       injury to competitors (here the plaintif fs), but with 
       injury to competition. That these plaintiffs are 
       prevented from working at AT&T , Lucent or their 
       affiliates for the limited time period during which the 
       pre-closing and post-closing nets were in effect is not 
       an injury to competition. In our view, plaintif fs' 
       allegations of economic injury to themselves 
       misperceive the nature of the injury which is required 
       to be established in order to sustain a claim under 
       Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Eichorn, CA No. 96-3587, slip op. at *20-21 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
While employees who are precluded fr om selling their 
labor have not necessarily suffered an antitrust injury, 
"employees may challenge antitrust violations that are 
premised on restraining the employment market." Phillip 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law  P 377a (rev. 
ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted); see also Brian R. Henry, 
`Sorry, We Can't Hire You . . . We Promised Not To': The 
Antitrust Implications of Entering Into No-Hir e Agreements, 
11-Fall Antitrust 39 (1996) ("Most courts considering the 
issue have held that employees suffer `injury' recognized by 
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the antitrust laws when their employment opportunities are 
restricted by a no-hire agreement between potential 
employers, and thus have standing to sue the entity 
imposing such a provision."). As a leading treatise on 
antitrust states: 
 
       Antitrust law addresses employer conspiracies 
       controlling employment terms precisely because they 
       tamper with the employment market and thereby 
       impair the opportunities of those who sell their services 
       there. Just as antitrust law seeks to pr eserve the free 
       market opportunities of buyers and sellers of goods, so 
       also it seeks to do the same for buyers and sellers of 
       employment services. It would be perverse indeed to 
       hold that the very object of the law's solicitude and the 
       persons most directly concerned--per haps the only 
       persons concerned--could not challenge the r estraint. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       An employee overcomes the primary hurdle to standing 
       when he shows that the alleged violation restrains 
       competition in the labor market. Of course, he must 
       still show injury-in-fact that was proximately caused 
       by the violation and, in damage cases, that can be 
       quantified without undue speculation. 
 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at P 377c (footnotes omitted). 
 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that a seaman, on 
behalf of himself and other members of the seamen's union, 
could sue an association of most of the shipowners in the 
region when the shipowners' association adopted unduly 
strict regulations governing employment. 272 U.S. at 359. 
The Court found the shipowners' agreement violated the 
antitrust laws because the regulations pr evented the "free 
exercise of the rights" of the seamen to engage in trade and 
commerce. Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Colgate & 
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Because unr egistered 
seamen were precluded from working on any association 
ship, which constituted the majority of the ships in the 
region, they suffered an injury pr otected under the 
antitrust laws. 
 
While Anderson was decided many years befor e the 
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Supreme Court detailed the antitrust injury r equirement in 
Brunswick,1 several courts since Brunswick have found that 
no-hire agreements which preclude employees from seeking 
employment from a third party employer can give rise to 
antitrust injury. In Cesnick v. Chrysler Corp. , 490 F. Supp. 
859 (M.D.Tenn. 1980), plaintiffs who wer e precluded from 
seeking re-employment at Chrysler when their division was 
sold to a third party suffered an antitrust injury. The Court 
reasoned that it "must conclude that the market for 
employee skills is a market subject to the pr ovisions of the 
Sherman Act." Id. at 864. 
 
More recently in Roman v. Cessna Air craft Co., 55 F.3d 
542 (10th Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that a plaintiff precluded from seeking 
employment as an airplane engineer with the Cessna 
Aircraft Company because of an agreement between Cessna 
and the Boeing Company not to hire each other's engineers 
suffered an antitrust injury. The Court r easoned that 
plaintiff 
 
       alleged that competition in the market for his services 
       as an employee had been directly impeded by 
       defendants' agreement not to compete for each other's 
       employees. He further alleges that he was injur ed by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Several other courts prior to Brunswick  held that employees barred 
from seeking employment from a thir d party employer because of a no- 
hire agreement have standing to litigate aS 1 claim. See, e.g., Radovich 
v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (coach precluded from 
working in National Football League because of agr eement among all of 
the teams in the league had standing); Quinonez v. Nat'l Assoc. of Secs. 
Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff who was fired by 
securities dealer and was unable to find employment with another 
securities dealer because of agreement among dealer firms not to hire an 
employee who was discharged by another fir m suffered sufficient injury 
to proceed with antitrust claim); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 
F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir.) ("Ther e can be little doubt that an employee 
who is deprived of a work opportunity has been injur ed . . . because the 
selling of one's labor is a commercial interest."), reh'g denied, 540 F.2d 
1085 (5th Cir. 1976); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 
(7th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff prohibited from seeking employment at 
competing employer because of agreement between employers in 
industry not to hire each other's employees suf fered injury sufficient to 
bring antitrust claim). 
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       that agreement because it prevented him fr om selling 
       his services to the highest bidder . . . . W e believe this 
       is sufficient to allege antitrust standing. 
 
Id. at 545; see also Law, 134 F .3d 1010 (coach whose 
opportunities in employment market were impair ed by 
agreement among members of NCAA to limit the maximum 
compensation paid to coaches suffered antitrust injury). 
 
In a similar manner, plaintiffs her e allege they have been 
precluded from selling their services to three companies 
within the industry, NCR, AT&T and Lucent, and that the 
no-hire agreement interfered with their ability to attain 
pension benefits. Because the no-hire agr eement directly 
impeded plaintiffs' ability to sell their labor to at least three 
companies within the competitive market and ef fectively 
cancelled their AT&T pension benefits, we believe they have 
standing to litigate their S 1 claims. Roman, 55 F.3d at 545. 
To the extent the District Court held that plaintiffs did not 
suffer an antitrust injury and lacked standing to litigate 
their S1 claims, it was in error. 
 
C. 
 
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that the no-hir e agreement 
was a group boycott and a horizontal pricefixing 
conspiracy. See Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 
U.S. 207, 211 (1959). As direct competitors for their labor, 
plaintiffs argue, the defendants enter ed the no-hire 
agreement as part of a concerted effort to lock them out of 
employment and decrease labor costs by eliminating 
pension benefits. See Nat'l Soc'y of Pr of. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 
692 (quoting United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 
U.S. 333 (1969) ("[A]n agreement that`interfere[s] with the 
setting of price by free market forces' is illegal on its face.")). 
Plaintiffs maintain that group boycotts and horizontal price 
fixing schemes between competitors are per se violations of 
the antitrust laws because these agreements ar e manifestly 
uncompetitive and are "naked restraints of trade . . . [that 
have] no purpose except stifling of competition." White 
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); see 
also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1958). In support, they cite NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the 
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Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984), wher e the Supreme 
Court stated, 
 
       Horizontal price fixing . . . [is] or dinarily condemned as 
       a matter of law under an `illegal per se' appr oach 
       because the probability that these practices ar e anti- 
       competitive is so high . . . . In such circumstances a 
       restraint is presumed unreasonable without inquiry 
       into the particular market context in which it is found. 
 
While plaintiffs contend the no-hire agr eement was per se 
illegal because it was a horizontal group boycott and a price 
fixing conspiracy, we can find no support within the 
relevant case law for this label. Br oad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. 
at 8 ("Easy labels do not always supply r eady answers."). 
The per se illegality rule applies only in those cases where 
the business practice in question is one, which on its face, 
has "no purpose except stifling of competition." White Motor 
Co., 372 U.S. at 263; see also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, 
Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 
(1985) (per se rule confined to limited types of anti- 
competitive practices); Larry Muko Inc. v. S.W . Pa. Bldg. and 
Const. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 429 (3d. Cir.) 
("Generally the application of the per se rule has been 
limited to those `classic' boycotts in which a gr oup of 
business competitors seek to benefit economically by 
excluding other competitors from the marketplace."), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). The Supreme Court has been 
cautious in extending the per se approach to claims that 
fall outside certain previously enumerated categories of 
liability. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. at 100 n.21 ("Judicial inexperience with a particular 
arrangement counsels against extending the r each of the 
per se rules."); Broad. Music, Inc. , 441 U.S. at 20 n.33 ("The 
per se rule is not employed until after considerable 
experience with the type of challenged restraint."); Maricopa 
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344 ("Experience with a 
particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict 
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it."). 
Because of the fact specific inquiry involved in antitrust 
analysis, the Supreme Court has recognized that claims not 
within established categories of antitrust liability are more 
appropriately analyzed under the rule of r eason where 
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courts can balance the effect of the alleged anti-competitive 
activity against its competitive purposes within the relevant 
product and geographic markets. 
 
Acknowledging this judicial hesitance to extend the per 
se rule to new categories of antitrust claims, we note there 
are no Supreme Court cases nor any federal cases that 
have applied the per se rule in similar factual 
circumstances. The only two federal cases that have 
analyzed similar group boycott and price fixing claims have 
held that no-hire agreements executed upon the sale of a 
corporation are analyzed under the rule of r eason. Coleman 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229, 1243 (E.D. Tenn. 
1986), aff 'd, 822 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1987); Cesnick, 490 F. 
Supp. at 866-67. In Coleman, the 3M Corporation sold its 
ceramics division to General Electric. 643 F . Supp. at 1243. 
After closing, 3M and General Electric enter ed an 
agreement in which 3M warranted that it would not rehire 
any employee who voluntarily accepted a job with General 
Electric. Several ceramic division employees br ought suit 
alleging a group boycott that was per se invalid under S 1 
of the Sherman Act. Disagreeing, the court reasoned that 
"courts have refused to apply the `gr oup boycott' 
designation where the effect is not to drive out competition 
but to achieve some other goal, whether or not the goal 
withstands the rule of reason analysis." Id. (citing Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
Because the agreement only precluded the plaintiffs from 
selling their services to one corporation, the court held it 
only had a "de minimus impact on the employment market 
in general," and the per se rule was "wholly inapplicable." 
Id. 
 
Similarly in Cesnick, former employees of Chrysler's Non- 
Automotive Air Conditioning Division sued underS 1 when 
Chrysler sold the division to the Fedders Corporation and 
agreed not to rehire its employees. 490 F. Supp. at 866. 
Although plaintiffs characterized the agr eement as a group 
boycott and a per se violation of S 1, the court stated, "[i]n 
the absence of any Supreme Court cases based on facts 
similar to those of this case, this Court will not accept the 
proposition that any conduct that can be characterized as 
a group boycott is a per se violation." Id. The court 
reasoned the Chrysler-Fedders' 
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       agreement was designed to increase the likelihood that 
       Fedders would enjoy the services of the experienced 
       AirTemp employees, an obviously sound business 
       purpose. To the extent that the agreement effectively 
       restrained competition between Chrysler and Fedders 
       for employee services, a competition whose existence is 
       entirely conjectural, that effect was incidental as well 
       as de minimus. 
 
Id. at 866-67. 
 
Cognizant that there are no Supreme Court cases holding 
no-hire agreements entered upon the legitimate sale of a 
business to a third party are per se antitrust violations,2 
and recognizing that the only two federal courts that have 
addressed the issue have declined to apply the per se rule, 
we hold the no-hire agreement here is more appropriately 
analyzed under the rule of reason. As several courts have 
recognized, the per se rules of illegality ar e the exception to 
antitrust analysis and are only employed in certain 
recognized categories. DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington 
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990). 
 
The District Court properly characterized the no-hire 
agreement as a common law covenant not to compete. As 
we discuss, courts have uniformly found that covenants not 
to compete should be examined under the rule of r eason. 
See, e.g., McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Consultants & 
Designers, Inc., v. Butler Serv. Group, Inc. , 720 F.2d 1553 
(11th Cir. 1983); Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 
(9th Cir. 1983); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 
255 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). 
Therefore, we will analyze plaintif fs' claims under the rule 
of reason so we can examine the effect of the defendants' 
agreement within the wider context of its competitive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Similarly, we can find no cases in which a no-hire agreement entered 
into upon the sale of a business to a third party that resulted in the 
loss 
of employee benefits was found to be a horizontal price fixing conspiracy. 
See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 
U.S. at 607-08 ("It is only after considerable experience with certain 
business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.")). 
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purposes and its impact on the relevant pr oduct and 
geographic markets. 
 
D. 
 
Under the rule of reason, we look at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding an alleged anti-competitive 
activity, including facts peculiar to the relevant business, to 
determine the "nature or purpose" of the allegedly illegal 
restraint. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 607. "The finder 
of fact must decide whether the questioned practice 
imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking 
into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed and the 
restraint's history, nature and ef fect." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 342). In 
applying this test, we examine the competitive significance 
of the alleged restraint to determine whether it has an anti- 
competitive effect on the market and is an unr easonable 
restraint on trade. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 
F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 
(1992). In this regard, covenants not to compete executed 
upon the sale of a business to a third party ar e generally 
not recognized as antitrust violations. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 
485 U.S. at 730 n.4 ("The classic ancillary r estraint is an 
agreement by the seller of a business not to compete within 
the market."); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689; 
Lektro-Vend Corp., 660 F.2d at 265 ("The recognized 
benefits of reasonably enforced noncompetition covenants 
are now beyond question."). As early as 1899, courts have 
recognized that covenants not to compete ar e not violations 
of S 1 of the Sherman Act because, 
 
       It [i]s of importance, as an incentive to industry and 
       honest dealing in trade, that, after a man ha[s] built up 
       a business with extensive good will, he should be able 
       to sell his business and good will to the best 
       advantage, and he could not do so unless he could 
       bind himself by an enforceable contract not to engage 
       in the same business in such a way as to prevent 
       injury to that which he was about to sell. 
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United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F . 271, 280 (6th 
Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 
In this vein, courts have characterized covenants not to 
compete executed upon the legitimate transfer of ownership 
of a business as ancillary restraints on trade. Id.; see also 
Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 730 n.4; United States v. 
Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 307 (8th Cir. 1976) 
("Covenants not to compete executed in conjunction with 
the purchase of a business allow the pur chaser to obtain 
the value of the good will for which he has paid."), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). So long as these covenants 
are reasonable in scope, there is no antitrust violation 
under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Syntex Labs., Inc., v. 
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) ("[I]t is hornbook law that a covenant not to compete 
ancillary to the sale of a business (or part of a business), 
when reasonably limited to time and territory, does not fall 
within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act."), aff 'd, 437 
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 
The District Court found, 
 
       In our view, the pre-closing and post-closing nets at 
       issue here are a subset of common law covenants not 
       to compete. Moreover, it is clear that the no-hire 
       agreements imposed restrictions which wer e "ancillary 
       to legitimate transactions," and thus properly 
       considered an ancillary restraint.  
 
Eichorn, CA No. 96-3587, slip op. at *23 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
We agree that the no-hire agr eement was not an 
unreasonable restraint of trade underS 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. , 411 F. Supp. 
1309, 1318 (D.Kan. 1976) ("Numerous Courts have 
recognized the general rule that agreements not to compete, 
entered into in conjunction with the ter mination of 
employment or sale of a business, do no offend the federal 
antitrust provisions if they are r easonable in duration and 
geographical limitation."). The primary purpose of the no- 
hire agreement was to ensure that T exas Pacific Group, as 
the purchaser of Paradyne, could retain the skilled services 
of Paradyne's employees. Although the no-hir e agreement 
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precluded the employees from seeking employment at an 
AT&T affiliate for 245 days, the primary purpose of the 
agreement was not anti-competitive. Contrary to plaintiffs' 
assertions, we can find no evidence to support their claim 
that the no-hire agreement was executed for the improper 
purpose of restraining trade and the cost of labor in the 
telecommunications industry. The primary purpose of the 
no-hire agreement was to ensure the successful sale of 
Paradyne to Texas Pacific Group which r equired workforce 
continuity.3 Any restraint on plaintiffs' ability to seek 
employment at AT&T and any effect on their pension 
bridging rights was incidental to the effective sale of 
Paradyne. 
 
Because the no-hire agreement was a legitimate ancillary 
restraint on trade, we must determine whether the eight 
month restriction from employment at an A T&T affiliate 
was reasonable or whether it went further than necessary 
to ensure the successful transition of ownership. Cesnick, 
490 F. Supp. at 868 (quoting Syntex Labs. , 315 F. Supp. at 
56) ("The question in every case [involving a covenant not to 
compete ancillary to the sale of a business] is whether the 
restraint is reasonably calculated to pr otect the legitimate 
interests of the purchaser in what he has purchased, or 
whether it goes so far beyond what is necessary as to 
provide a basis for the inference that its real purpose is the 
fostering of monopoly."). 
 
We do not think the eight month restriction on re- 
employment at an AT&T affiliate was unr easonably broad. 
It is reasonable to believe Texas Pacific Group would 
require the technical skills of these employees for at least 
this eight month period, if not longer, to ensure a 
successful transition of ownership from Lucent. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs contend the true motive of the no-hire agreement was not 
work force continuity but eliminating pension benefits to reduce Texas 
Pacific Group's costs. They argue that if work force continuity were 
really 
the motive, Texas Pacific Group could have offered enhanced benefits 
packages to entice the work force to remain with Paradyne rather then 
simply agreeing to cancel their AT&T pension benefits. But the existence 
of alternative means to achieve a legitimate business goal does not in 
itself mean the defendants' chosen course of action was uncompetitive 
and improper. 
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Furthermore, the no-hire agr eement only precluded the 
plaintiffs from working at Lucent or an A T&T affiliate. The 
employees were free to leave Texas Pacific Group and seek 
employment elsewhere within the telecommunications 
industry. Significantly, there is no evidence in the record to 
support plaintiffs' claim that AT&T was the only employer 
in the market to whom they could sell their services. As the 
District Court found, there are over twenty other 
telecommunications firms that compete for plaintiffs' 
technical services. Furthermore, the market for plaintiffs 
with more generalized educational and work backgrounds 
includes "a vast number of jobs" nationwide. Eichorn, CA 
No. 96-3587, slip op. at *27-28 n.17. 
 
Therefore, we hold the no-hire agr eement was not an 
unreasonable restraint on trade. As an ancillary covenant 
not to compete, the no-hire agreement was reasonable in its 
restrictions on the plaintiffs' ability to seek employment 
elsewhere. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689. 
While the no-hire agreement essentially barred the 
plaintiffs' ability to retain their desirable AT&T pension 
benefits, S 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act is not the 
appropriate vehicle here for redr ess. In formulating their 
claim in antitrust parlance, plaintiffs have argued their 
inability to work at their former jobs was a manifestly 
uncompetitive restraint on trade within the r elevant 
market. We disagree. In order to advance their antitrust 
claim, plaintiffs are forced to define narrowly the relevant 
market affected by the defendants' activity as, 
 
       potential employers within a 35 mile radius of 
       Holmdel/Middletown with the capacity and capability 
       of employing or utilizing large numbers of persons with 
       specialized experience in high speed data 
       communications equipment of the sort Paradyne 
       develops and makes . . . who can provide continuity of 
       the pension benefits which have accrued to [plaintiffs] 
       under the AT&T and/or Lucent pension plans. 
 
Eichorn, CA No. 96-3587, slip op. at *29-30 n.18. 
 
We believe this narrow market definition is inappropriate. 
As we recently stated, "[t]he outer boundaries of a product 
market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability 
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of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the 
product itself and substitutes for it." Queen City Pizza, Inc., 
v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir.) (quoting 
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325), r eh'g denied, 129 F.3d 
724 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 (1998). "The test for 
a relevant market is not commodities [in this case technical 
jobs] reasonably interchangeable by a particular plaintiff, 
but `commodities [technical employees] r easonably 
interchangeable by consumers [technology companies] for 
the same purposes.' " Id. at 438 (quoting United States v. 
E.I. DuPont Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)). 
Additionally, we have said "the relevant geographic market 
is the area in which a potential buyer may rationally look 
for the goods or services he or she seeks." Pa. Dental Assn. 
v. Med. Serv. Assn. of Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); see also Brokerage 
Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 515 
(3d Cir. 1998). This geographic market must"conform to 
commercial reality." Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Wharton Hardware 
& Supply Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (D.N.J. 1995) 
(citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 336). 
 
By defining the market so narrowly that it only includes 
the defendants, plaintiffs' proffer ed geographic and product 
markets are unrealistic.4 The market for the plaintiffs' labor 
is much broader. We agree with the District Court that the 
relevant market is not limited to AT&T and its affiliates but 
rather includes all those technology companies and 
network services providers who actively compete for 
employees with the skills and training possessed by  
plaintiffs.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Plaintiffs argue they are under no obligation to define the relevant 
product and geographic markets because the defendants' conduct per se 
violated the antitrust laws. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984). Because we find this case is governed 
under the rule of reason, plaintiffs necessarily have the affirmative 
burden of proving the relevant pr oduct and geographic markets affected 
by the defendants' alleged uncompetitive activity. Ideal Dairy Farms Inc. 
v. John LaBatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiffs 
must present evidence from which rational person could conclude the 
relevant markets are actually what plaintiffs allege them to be). 
5. As previously noted, the District Court found there are over twenty 
companies that compete for employees with plaintif fs' technical skills. 
Additionally there are a "vast number of jobs" nationwide for plaintiffs 
with more generalized work and educational experience. Eichorn, CA No. 
96-3587, slip op. at *27-28 n.17. 
 
                                21 
  
Because market realities reflect that the no-hire 
agreement did not have a significant anti-competitive effect 
on the plaintiffs' ability to seek employment within this 
broader telecommunications market nor that itfixed the 
cost of labor in the industry, we conclude it was not an 
antitrust violation under the rule of reason. 6 The antitrust 
laws were not designed to protect every uncompetitive 
activity, but rather only those activities that have anti- 
competitive effects on the market as a whole. Broad. Music, 
Inc., 441 U.S. at 23 ("Not all arrangements among actual or 
potential competitors that have an impact on price are per 
se violations of the Sherman Act or even unr easonable 
restraints."). While plaintiffs' loss of their pension benefits 
gives us pause, we believe they can seek redr ess through 
other statutes more adequately suited to their injury than 
S 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7 Chambless v. Masters, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Plaintiffs also attempt to characterize defendants' activity as an 
illegal 
exercise of relational market power. See Sullivan & Grimes, The Law of 
Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook S 2.4e2iv (2000); Warren S. Grimes, 
Market Definition in Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the 
Franchisor's Conflict of Interest, 67 Antitrust L.J. 243 (1999). They 
contend AT&T offered a unique pension benefits program that essentially 
locked the plaintiffs into working for them. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). Claiming that AT&T was 
the only telecommunications company within the industry that offered 
such an extensive benefits program, plaintif fs maintain they were 
prevented from seeking employment at any other company, since to do 
so would result in the loss of valuable pension benefits. According to 
this 
argument, the no-hire agreement that precluded plaintiffs from working 
at an AT&T affiliate prevented them fr om working at the only company 
within the industry where they could receive these unique benefits. See, 
e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968). Central to plaintiffs' 
argument is the contention that the AT&T pension benefits are unique 
in the industry. We see no evidence for this in the record. Therefore, we 
need not address whether to extend the r elational market power analysis 
to the facts of this case. 
 
7. Although the no-hire agreement ef fectively cancelled the plaintiffs' 
AT&T benefits, these plaintiffs were free to seek employment elsewhere 
in the industry where pension benefits may have been available. But 
even though defendants' activity was not a pricefixing conspiracy under 
the Sherman Act, it may give rise to liability under S 510 of ERISA where 
a different analysis is involved. 
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Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 
1985) ("To the extent that the . . . [plaintiff 's antitrust 
claim] is based on diminished retirement benefits, it is 
essentially an ERISA matter."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 
(1986). 
 
IV. 
 
We now turn to whether the no-hir e agreement, which 
effectively cancelled plaintiffs' A T&T pension bridging 
rights, violated S 510 of ERISA. Section 510 of ERISA 
provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person to dischar ge, fine, 
       suspend, expel, discipline or discriminate against a 
       participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to 
       which he is entitled under the provisions of the 
       employee benefit plan . . . for the purpose of interfering 
       with the attainment of any right to which such 
       participant may become entitled under the plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1140 (1994). 
 
Congress enacted S 510 "primarily to prevent 
unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing 
their employees in order to keep them fr om obtaining 
vested pension benefits." DeWitt v. Penn-Del Directory Corp., 
106 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1997). W e have held an 
employer violates S 510 when it acts with the specific intent 
to interfere with an employee's right to benefits. DiFederico 
v. Rolm Co., 201 F.3d 200, 204-05 (3d Cir . 2000). To prove 
a prima facie case under S 510 a plaintif f must show (1) 
that an employer took specific actions (2) for the purpose of 
interfering (3) with an employee's attainment of pension 
benefit rights. Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987). We held in 
DiFederico that once a plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing, the employer has the burden of articulating a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his conduct. Then, 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer's rationale was not pre-textual and that the 
cancellation of benefits was the "deter minative influence" 
on the employer's actions. DiFederico, 201 F .3d at 205. 
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The crucial threshold issue in this case is whether 
defendants AT&T and Lucent8 had the specific intent to 
interfere with the Paradyne employees' pension benefit 
rights or whether the cancellation of the bridging rights was 
merely an incidental by-product of the sale of Paradyne. 
DeWitt, 106 F.3d at 523 ("[E]mployee must show that the 
employer made a conscious decision to interfer e with the 
employee's attainment of pension eligibility or additional 
benefits."). Plaintiffs allege the no-hir e agreement and its 
eight month restriction on re-employment was enacted for 
"the direct and immediate objective and with the singular 
purpose of eliminating the Paradyne pensions." In support 
of their claim, plaintiffs argue the eight month restriction 
on re-employment is suspiciously close to the six month 
vesting period of the AT&T pension plan and that this 
temporal proximity provides circumstantial evidence that 
the cancellation of the benefits was a motivating factor in 
the timing of the no-hire agreement. Additionally, they 
point to the role of Paradyne's Vice-Pr esident of Human 
Resources in proposing Texas Pacific Group's ultimate 
pension package for the Paradyne employees. Plaintif fs also 
cite a confidential memorandum between Larry Knoch and 
Linda Roussau of Lucent Technologies, which acknowledges 
the eight month restriction in the no-hir e agreement had 
the practical effect of cancelling the Paradyne employees' 
pension rights. Finally, plaintiffs point to the economic 
benefits that both Lucent and AT&T received from the no- 
hire agreement, specifically that neither defendant was 
required to pay for pension benefits, as evidence of specific 
intent to interfere with an ERISA pension plan in violation 
of S 510. Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 348 
(3d. Cir. 1990) (savings to an employer that result from 
employees' termination might be viewed as a motivating 
factor sufficient to satisfy the intent element ofS 510 
liability). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In their complaint plaintiffs did not allege that Texas Pacific Group 
violated S 510 of ERISA. App. at 92a, 157a ("Plaintiffs demand judgment 
. . . declaring the refusal of AT&T and Lucent to employ members of the 
Class until after the expiration of their pension bridging rights to be in 
violation of ERISA section 510, 29 U.S.C. S 1140."). 
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Although the District Court found this evidence 
insufficient to support a finding of specific intent to 
interfere with the plaintiffs' benefit plans,9 Eichorn, CA No. 
96-3587, slip op. at *9-12, we believe at this stage of the 
proceedings plaintiffs have presented sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of intent to inter fere with their 
pension rights to create a genuine issue of material fact.10 
Turner, 901 F.2d at 347 ("Employee may show [a violation 
of S 510] . . . by circumstantial evidence."). As we held in 
DeWitt, "[i]n most cases, . . .`smoking gun' evidence of 
specific intent to discriminate does not exist. As a result, 
the evidentiary burden in these cases may also be satisfied 
by the introduction of circumstantial evidence." 106 F.3d at 
523 (quoting Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851). Of course we 
express no opinion whether plaintiffs will prevail at trial 
under the preponderance of evidence standar d for S 510 
claims. DiFederico, 201 F.3d at 205 ("[If] employer carries 
its burden, the plaintiff then must persuade the court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In its initial order granting summary judgment on the antitrust 
claims, the District Court found plaintiffs pr oduced enough evidence to 
survive a motion for summary judgment on the ERISA claim. Upon 
reconsideration, the District Court reversed its position stating it 
improperly relied on circumstantial evidence that the defendants 
experienced an overall economic gain from the no-hire agreement and 
sale of Paradyne. In re-examining the r elevant case law, the court said 
the proper inquiry should focus on the r eduction in actual benefit 
expenses caused by the termination of employees, rather than a broader 
assessment of the overall financial impact of ter mination on the 
employer's business. See Clark v. Coates & Clark , 990 F.2d 1217, 1224 
(11th Cir. 1993) ("[M]easures designed to reduce costs in general that 
also result in an incidental reduction in benefits expenses do not suggest 
discriminatory intent."). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit. But we hold 
that plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence that both AT&T and 
Lucent received a direct and substantialfinancial gain from the 
cancellation of pension benefits, namely they wer e relieved from paying 
large sums for the pension benefits of the several Paradyne employees 
affected by the agreement. 
 
10. We believe a genuine issue of material fact exists only with the Pre 
and Post-Closing Nets' effect on the Paradyne employees' pension rights. 
Because the Preliminary Net did not prohibit plaintiffs from receiving 
their pension benefits as employees of Lucent T echnologies, it did not 
violate S 510 of ERISA. 
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legitimate reason is pre-textual."). Because plaintiffs have 
submitted sufficient prima facie evidence to withstand 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, we will r everse 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
V. 
 
Plaintiffs contend the District Court err ed when it denied 
their motion for additional discovery for a contemplated 
motion for class certification on their ERISAS 510 claim. In 
denying plaintiffs' motion the District Court stated, "[W]e do 
not find that . . . Third Circuit[ ] . . . [precedent] requires 
this Court to keep this matter open so that plaintif fs may 
engage in discovery and motion practice on the issue of 
class certification when the underlying claims have been 
dismissed with prejudice." Eichor n, CA No. 96-3887, slip 
op. at *18. Because we hold plaintiffs have submitted 
sufficient prima facie evidence to support their ERISA S 510 
claim, we believe they may be entitled to additional 
discovery to pursue a possible motion for class certification. 
Accordingly, we direct the District Court on remand to 
address plaintiffs' motion for additional discovery and any 
future motion for class certification under the requirements 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c). 
 
VI. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' antitrust claims. W e will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' ERISAS 510 
claims. We will also reverse the Court's order denying 
plaintiffs' motion for additional discovery for an anticipated 
class certification motion and, on remand, direct the 
District Court to address this issue in accor dance with the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c). 
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